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Abstract 
This paper discusses how income inequality developed during the current crisis in euro area 
countries, as well as the role played by each income source. Based on an extended definition 
of income – including additional components which do not appear in the standard Eurostat 
definitions – we complement the information provided by the Gini index and quantile ratios 
by computing an alternative inequality indicator, developed by Zenga (2007), and its 
decomposition by income source. While broadly confirming the distributional effect of the 
crisis documented in previous studies, we find that in specific countries the level of inequality 
appears higher when alternative measures are taken into account, and that the rise of 
inequality since 2008 has not been as modest as previous studies would suggest. The paper 
further looks at how the distribution of income has evolved during the crisis by income 
quantile  groups  (i.e.  ‘zooming-in’).  The  results  point  to  varying contribution of labour income 
in   2011   compared   to   2007.   In   addition,   while   the   impact   of   individual   households’  
characteristics shows a non-linear pattern across income quantile groups before the crisis, 
such dispersion has decreased in 2011. We argue that, on the basis of our analysis, not only 
euro   area   countries   are   “differently   unequal”   in   that   inequality   has   developed   in   a   very  
peculiar way in different countries, but also that it needs to be tackled at a finer level of 
analysis. 
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Differently unequal  
Zooming-in on the distributional dimensions 
of the crisis in euro area countries 
 
 
1. Introduction   
The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked the start of a severe and protracted 
recession in both Europe and the US. A number of euro area countries 
experienced the deepest downturn since the Great Depression; at the same 
time, the negative growth prospects were reinforced by the sovereign debt 
crisis which triggered considerable fiscal consolidation efforts in vulnerable 
euro area economies. Not surprisingly, how these developments have affected 
income distribution has recently come back to the attention of academics and 
policy makers.  
 
Income distribution developments are often seen as mainly relevant from a 
social cohesion point of view, with negligible (if any) direct impact on 
economic performance. Yet, a large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies shows that income distribution does matter for subsequent growth. 
According to Alesina and Perotti (1996), highly unequal societies are 
characterised by considerable socio-political instability, as well as by high 
uncertainty in the protection of property rights, which discourage investment 
and inhibit growth (see also Keefer and Knack, 2002).  At the same time, when 
credit   constraints   are   binding,   a   higher   degree   of   income   “polarisation”  
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would result into a higher percentage of individuals in the lower tail of the 
distribution whose income is below the cost of education, thereby reducing 
the incentive to invest in human capital accumulation with ultimate 
detrimental effects on growth. The latter effect would be significant in rich 
economies (see for instance Perotti 1993 and 1996), and particularly when 
considering that higher levels of inequality are normally associated with 
lower social and economic mobility, and therefore with lower investment in 
education generation after generation. Finally, in more unequal societies, 
interests groups are more prone to engage in rent-seeking activities which are 
harmful for growth (Perotti, 1996 and Benabou, 1996). At the same time, 
however, a number of studies point at a positive impact of inequality on 
growth prospects (Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000). According to this 
literature, when favouring the rich, inequality would spur aggregate savings 
and growth. Furthermore, a certain degree of inequality may induce 
individuals to increase their effort to access higher income levels.  
 
Overall, whether inequality is good or bad for growth is still a debated issue. 
Clearly, the answer to this question is not independent of the stage of 
economic development. According to Galor and Moav (2004), at earlier stages 
of development, physical capital is relatively scarce and therefore inequality 
would have a positive impact on growth by channelling resources towards 
those segments of the population with a higher propensity to save. The 
opposite would hold at later stages of development, in which human capital 
accumulation becomes the main engine of growth, and inequality would 
exacerbate the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital 
investment and growth. At the same time, for a given level of economic 
development, changes in overall inequality – however measured – may 
correspond to very different scenarios, and therefore have very different 
implications for growth, depending on what portions of the income 
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distribution are affected. Based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study, 
Voitchovsky (2005) shows that while top end inequality is positively related 
with economic performance, inequality at the bottom end proves to be 
harmful for growth.  These offsetting effects may explain the fact that 
sometimes inequality – captured by summary statistics such as the Gini 
coefficient – appears insignificant in growth equations, calling for analyses 
looking at a wide array of indicators at a more granular level.  
 
Given the significance of inequality on growth, the aim of this paper is to look 
at how inequality has evolved in euro area countries since the start of the 
crisis and – more importantly – to shed light on which portions of the income 
distribution are actually driving the observed dynamics. This has the 
potential to help identify common patterns across countries and to 
distinguish  those  cases  where  inequality  can  be  considered  “good”  or  “bad”  – 
i.e. whether inequality is likely to be conducive to higher growth or 
unfavourably affect economic performance. This issue appears particularly 
important in the current juncture, as the shape of income distribution – in 
principle – can either reinforce the persistence of a recession phase or be 
among the driving forces behind a faster recovery.  
 
A growing number of empirical studies have recently explored the 
distributional impact of the crisis by focusing on a wide array of variables 
such as income, earnings, consumption expenditure and wealth (Jenkins et al., 
2011; Heathcote et al., 2010; Petev et al., 2011; Perri and Steinberg, 2012). In all 
of these studies, developments in income distribution are normally discussed 
with reference to a standard set of indicators, such as the average and median 
income, the Gini coefficient, the poverty rate. While undeniably useful, these 
indicators do not allow properly taking into account the relationship between 
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the lower tail and the upper tail of the income distribution. In particular, 
Heatcote et al. (2010) present empirical results of the evolution of inequality in 
the United States for the years 1967-2006, suggesting that inequality may have 
several dimensions. They find that wage inequality presents a steady increase 
in the course of the years considered and that taxes and transfers have had an 
impact on the lower tail of the distribution (the poorest) but little effect on 
aggregate inequality. Perry and Steinberg (2012) explored the way the crisis 
has impacted economic inequality in the United States, analysing, among the 
others, earnings, disposable income, consumption and wealth: they argue that 
a more in-depth analysis on the different income sources is key to draw a 
clearer picture. Moreover, the same authors argue that redistribution policies 
made it possible to contain falloffs in consumption for the bottom quintile of 
the distribution.  
 
All these studies point to the methodological need to investigate the impact of 
the recent economic crisis along several (micro) dimensions and variables. 
Moreover, we believe that such an analysis needs to be done within the euro 
area context as well, as it could assist the identification of common patterns 
or, vice versa, heterogeneous recovery dynamics. Due to the heterogeneity of 
the countries belonging to the euro area, we advocate a country-based 
analysis is fundamental to better understand how the crisis has impacted 
inequality developments in the Eurozone. In addition, the studies mentioned 
above suggest the need of breaking down the analysis by studying the effects 
of individual income levels and family types. That is what we attempt in this 
paper. 
 
Based on household level data from the EU Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), the paper looks for alternative inequality indicators. 
The analysis is performed for the cross-sections 2004 to 2011. In particular, the 
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paper makes use of a (relatively) new (albeit, admittedly, less known) 
indicator, the Zenga index (2007), which allows to detect, with identical 
receptivity, deviations from equality in any parts of the distribution (see 
Section 4). The latter indicator is used to complement the information 
provided by the Gini index – thereby allowing a comparison with the results 
available in the literature. Following the approach proposed in Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1984; 1985) and in Zenga and Radaelli (2007), the evolution of the 
Gini and Zenga indexes is further decomposed into the contribution to overall 
inequality coming from single income sources. This allows to quantitatively 
assess how inequality developed as a result of the economic crisis, especially 
in those economies which were more hardly hit. Beside an analysis on 
baseline disposable income, inequality is further analysed with reference to an 
extended income definition, including additional income components, some 
of which being particularly relevant in the current conjuncture. 
 
Despite providing an alternative income definition, the novelty of our 
approach stands in looking at how the distribution of income has evolved 
during  the  crisis  by  income  quantile  groups  (i.e.  referred  to  as  ‘zooming-in’).  
An analysis of income inequality at such a granular level is indeed made 
possible by the use of the Zenga index (2007) and its linearity property (see 
Section 4). Digging into inequality dynamics is key, especially since 
movements at different levels of the distribution may not necessarily translate 
into higher (lower) inequality overall, and in particular if larger movements 
from people in the mid into the lower end of the distribution are compensated 
by a relative depletion of people at the top end of the distribution. It is worth 
noting, in fact, that increases (decreases) of inequality measures, however 
defined, do not necessarily mean a worsening (improvement) in the 
distribution of income.  At one extreme, inequality may increase as a result of 
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a higher share of population moving to higher income levels, the position of 
the lower tail of the distribution being unchanged. Such an outcome may be 
actually read as a Pareto improvement. Conversely, changes in inequality 
over time may be driven by the poorest segments of the population. At those 
extremes, policy implications would be very different.  Therefore, in order to 
be able to capture different dimensions of inequality it is necessary to take a 
closer look at i) a wider array of indicators, ii) the contribution of each income 
sources and iii) observe such contribution not only in the aggregate, but also 
by population sub-groups. In addition, and as discussed previously, previous 
studies have shown that the crisis has had different effects on income 
inequality in different countries. We argue that such country-specific 
dynamics needs to be brought to an even finer level of analysis. In fact, we 
find that the inequality dynamics, and particularly pre- and post-crisis 
comparisons, are extremely articulated. Our analysis based on the 
decomposition of different indexes by sources, shows quite clearly that 
inequality patterns are specific to each country/source/income level 
combination. In particular, the results suggest that the distributional impact of 
the crisis has evolved in quite different ways in several countries and 
‘zooming-in’  may  help  capture  some  of  this  heterogeneity.  We  argue  that,  on  
the   basis   of   our   analysis,   not   only   euro   area   countries   are   “differently  
unequal”  in  that  inequality  has  developed  in  a  very  peculiar  way  in  different  
countries, but also that it needs to be tackled at a finer level of analysis. In this 
respect, redistribution policies need to be fine-tuned along these lines, rather 
than addressing the problem from an aggregate viewpoint. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 outline 
the main features of the dataset and possible statistical issues; they further 
discuss the extended income definition used in the paper. Section 4 introduces 
the alternative inequality indicator (Zenga, 2007) and presents its 
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methodological decomposition, compared to the Gini index. Section 5 
presents the main results, by further tackling the distributional impact of the 
crisis for specific income levels. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data   
We use net income flows data from the Eurostats Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions for 12 euro area countries over the period 2004-2011, 
allowing to cover the period immediately preceding the financial crisis and 
the following economic downturn. The euro area countries considered are (in 
alphabetical order): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), 
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT).1  
 
The EU-SILC provides the longest time series of comparable and consistently 
defined individual level data for income and living conditions available for 
the euro area. One of the attractive features of the EU-SILC, compared to 
other   surveys,   is   that   it   provides   not   only   details   on   each   individual’s   and  
household’s  characteristics (i.e. family composition, etc.), but also information 
on  the  level  of  household  income  and  measures  of  households’  wealth  such  as  
households’  ability   to   face  unexpected   financial  expenses,  mortgage  burden,  
etc. Cross-sectional data are available for total household gross and net 
income. Table 1 further clarifies the difference between gross and net incomes. 
                                                        1 Excluding data prior to 2004 is necessary due to missing data. While the EU-SILC is potentially concerned with a wider set of countries, we focus on those countries whose dynamics are more 
relevant	   to	   dynamics	   of	   the	   euro	   area	   as	   a	   whole,	   thus	   covering	   “program and vulnerable 
countries”	   (Cyprus	   (CY),	   Spain	   (ES),	   Greece	   (GR),	   Ireland	   (IE),	   Italy	   (IT),	   Portugal	   (PT))	   and	  
“northern	  countries”	  (Austria	  (AT),	  Belgium	  (BE),	  Germany	  (DE),	  Finland	  (FI),	  France	  (FR),	   the	  Netherlands (NL)). 
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The former is defined as the sum for all household members of gross personal 
income components (gross employee cash or near cash income) plus gross 
income components at household level. Net (or disposable) income equals 
gross  income  minus  tax  (including  “Regular  taxes  on  wealth”,  “Regular  inter-
household   cash   transfer   paid”   and   “Tax   on   income   and   social   insurance  
contributions”;  see  Table  1). Income is available for almost all countries over 
the whole sample period (for Ireland the last available wave in the EU-SILC 
was 2010). Summary statistics on the data employed (gross and net incomes) 
are reported in Table 1A (Annex 1). The only restriction imposed to the data is 
that observations for which income sources are available should report total 
incomes as well, and vice versa. Yet, this leaves a consistent number of 
observations.2 In the following sections, the evolution of inequality is 
presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07). Normalizing income 
is useful to deal with the fact that inequality may have been characterized as 
“bubbly”  in  the  pre-crisis period in some countries. For further comparisons, 
the results for inequality indexes over the whole sample period 2004-11 are 
anyway provided in Annex 1 (Figure 1A), where available.   
 
Comparing income inequality across countries requires using scaling factors, 
which   weight   households’   incomes   according   to   their   composition.   The  
household weighting scheme adopted here is based on equivalence scales 
measures. The intuition behind using weighting schemes is that of accounting 
for income to grow within each additional household member in a non-
proportional way (see Atkinson et al., 1995; World Bank, 2002). Following a 
standard practice, we rely on the OECD-modified scale assuming, for 
instance, that a household of two adults and two children has different needs                                                         2 Given the consistency check between sources and total income, the data coverage for our extended income may vary, depending on the coverage of the two new income sources considered. In particular, this availability reduces to Cyprus, Germany and the Netherlands: 2005-11; Spain, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal: 2007-11. For Austria, Belgium, Finland and Ireland, extended disposable income is available over the whole sample period, 2004-11. 
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(e.g., roughly twice as much) as one composed of a single person. While this 
choice clearly depends on technical assumptions about economies of scale, as 
well as on judgments about the priority assigned to the needs of different 
individuals – such as children or the elderly – it also allows comparability 
with other studies and official publications (e.g., Eurostat). In this way, each 
household type in the population is assigned a value in proportion to its 
(assumed) produced income, mainly taking into account the size of the 
household and the age of its members – whether they are adults or children 
(see OECD, 2008; 2011).  
 
For each household, total disposable and gross incomes are imputed 
consistently with the underlying income components, as described by the 
Eurostat’s  EU-SILC User Guide. In order to allow for a decomposition of total 
income (either gross or net) by components, income sources are partitioned 
according to (cash and non-cash) labour income, cash transfers, other sources 
of income, and direct taxes (the latter for net income, only). Within the labour 
income component, we further distinguish among income from employment, 
income from self-employment and non-cash labour income. Following 
Jenkins et al. (2011) we define cash transfers, including all cash benefits from 
the government plus transfers (such as state retirement pensions), and other 
income sources (mainly including income from investment and savings).3,4 
                                                                                                                                                  
In addition, and given the availability of new income components, the                                                         3 A residual component is included in order to ensure consistency between aggregate income (whether gross or net) and individual income sources. Importantly, the residual component represents the part of income which is not accounted for by the available income decomposition sources in the EU-SILC. While we take the residual into account for the sake of consistency and transparency of the results, we did some robustness checks to show that this residual is irrelevant in the income decomposition exercise for most countries. This check is not reported here for sake of brevity. The results are however available upon request from the authors. For a technical discussion see Annex 2.    4 See EU-SILC User Guide. 
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analysis focuses on an extended income definition. The rationale behind 
referring to a wider definition of income is that of accounting for additional 
income sources which may have played a non-negligible  role  in  households’  
balances, particularly during the last cycle. The additional income sources 
relevant to this extension are (i) pensions received from individual private 
plans (other than those covered under the European System of integrated 
Social Protection Statistics - ESSPROS) and (ii) interests paid on mortgages, 
treated here as negative income source. Further details about the extended 
income definition are provided in Table 1. In our analysis, the component of 
interests on mortgage is intentionally kept separate from other income 
sources,   in   order   to   highlight   the   effect   of   mortgages   on   private   sector’s  
leveraging in some countries. 
 
Table 1 – Income definitions   
Dispos
able in
come (
net) 
 
Income
 (gross
) 
Paper definition of disposable income EU-SILC definitions  Labour income Gross employee cash or near cash income  Labour income from  self-employment Gross cash benefits or losses from self- employment (including royalties) Non-cash labour income Company car (from 2007, before it is gross non-cash employee income, see Eurostat)  Cash tranfers                     
Unemployment benefits Old-age benefits  Survivor' benefits Sickness benefits Disability benefits Education-related allowances  Family/children related allowances  Social exclusion not elsewhere classified Housing allowances Regular inter-household cash transfers received Income received by people aged under 16  Other income     Income from rental of a property or land  Interests, dividends, profit from capital  investments  in unincorporated business  
Pensions received from individual private plans  
(other than those covered under ESSPROS) 
Interests on Mortgages Interest paid on mortgage   Taxes     Regular taxes on wealth Regular inter-household cash transfer paid Tax on income and social insurance contributions  
Note: Sources entering extended income definition are in bold. 
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3. Standard indicators of inequality  
 
By looking at the standard array of inequality indicators adopted in the 
literature, the evolution of the Gini index over time (Figure 1) shows that, 
since the crisis, inequality initially declined in some countries. In most cases, 
inequality started rising again during the period of analysis, well above (as in 
the case of Spain and Ireland) or very close (e.g., in Greece and Italy) to the 
levels observed before the start of the crisis. The case of France stands alone, 
with inequality systematically increasing over the entire sample. The opposite 
dynamics are recorded in Germany and the Netherlands, with inequality 
overall trending lower starting from 2008. The after-crisis picture of inequality 
remained broadly stable in all other countries.  
Figure 1 – GINI Index - after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income   
 
Note: Countries	  are	  clustered	  according	  to	  “program	  and	  vulnerable	  countries”	  (Cyprus	  
(CY),	   Spain	   (ES),	   Greece	   (GR),	   Ireland	   (IE),	   Italy	   (IT),	   Portugal	   (PT)),	   and	   “northern 
countries”	   (Austria	   (AT),	   Belgium	   (BE),	   Germany	   (DE),	   Finland	   (FI),	   France	   (FR),	   the	  Netherlands (NL)). Where data are available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100). 
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Figure 2 – p90/p10 ratio - after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income   
 
Note: Countries	  are	  clustered	  according	  to	  “program	  and	  vulnerable	  countries”	  (Cyprus	  
(CY),	   Spain	   (ES),	   Greece	   (GR),	   Ireland	   (IE),	   Italy	   (IT),	   Portugal	   (PT)),	   and	   “northern	  
countries”	   (Austria	   (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Finland (FI), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL)). Where data are available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100). 
 
The evolution of the income ratio of the richest and the poorest 10% of the 
population provides a broadly similar picture (Figure 2), with some notable 
exceptions. It should be noted, in first place, that the same evolution of the 
quantile ratio masks rather different dynamics across countries, with 
potentially different policy implications. For instance, the strong increase of 
the ratio in Spain reflects both a noticeable worsening in the lowest tail of the 
distribution as well as a significant increase of the income level of the richest 
(not reported here for sake of brevity). This is, for instance, different in France, 
where the observed dynamics results from an improvement in both segments 
of the population, with the richest moving towards relatively higher levels of 
income. While not accurate, such a quick inspection suggests that looking at 
the extent of inequality among specific income quantiles may provide useful 
(and more in-depth) information about the homogeneity of different income 
strata in the population; thus, being a crucial element to consider when 
looking at the effect of policy interventions. Further, the analysis above seems 
to suggest the information provided by the quantile ratios not to be always 
consistent with that provided by a synthetic indicator such as the Gini index. 
In particular, by looking – again – at the case of Spain, the Gini index would 
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show a mild increase in inequality in 2010-11 (+5%), while the ratio between 
the number of households in the top and the bottom quantiles increased three 
times as much over the same period, well above the value observed before the 
crisis. Yet again, while quantile ratios are very synthetic and ignore 
information on incomes in the middle of the distribution – nor they use 
information about the income distribution within the top and bottom 
quantiles – these developments are enough to conclude that the tails of the 
distribution play a relevant role; in which case the Gini index may not 
provide a reliable picture (see Section 4). 
 
Table 2 – GINI Index – before- and after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income variables     Gross income  (extended definition)     Disposable income (extended definition)   2007 2011 first diff.     2007 2011 first diff. PT 41.8 39.1 -2.7   PT 37.3 34.8 -2.5 IE 36.1 37.9 1.9   ES 31.4 33.2 1.8 GR 38.2 36.4 -1.8   GR 33.6 33.0 -0.5 IT 35.8 35.8 0.0   IE 31.0 32.8 1.9 ES 33.7 35.0 1.3   IT 31.9 31.7 -0.1 FR 29.7 33.7 4.0   FR 26.6 31.0 4.4 DE 33.6 33.2 -0.4   EA 
average 
29.0 29.1 0.0 
EA 
average 
33.0 32.8 -0.2   DE 29.6 29.0 -0.5 BE 31.3 31.3 0.0   AT 26.4 26.4 0.1 AT 30.6 31.0 0.5   FI 26.1 26.3 0.1 FI 30.7 30.3 -0.4   BE 26.1 26.1 0.0 NL 32.0 30.0 -2.0   NL 27.0 25.1 -1.8  
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Countries are ranked in descending order according to Gini inequality index as measured in the latest available year (2011, 2010 in case of IE). 
 
Table 2 finally shows the Gini coefficient computed on the gross and 
disposable extended incomes (both equivalized), as defined previously, over 
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the periods 2007 and 2011 (2010 in the case of Ireland). Importantly, countries 
are ranked in descending order according to inequality indexes as measured 
in the latest available year.  
 
Not surprisingly, the level of inequality in all countries is lower when after-
tax   income   is   taken   into   account.   Interestingly,   however,   countries’   relative  
position somewhat changes depending on whether their rank is based on 
gross or net income. Among euro area countries, Spain appears as the country 
with the second highest level of inequality when looking at disposable 
income; being further away from the euro area average with respect to the 
gross income ranking. The opposite holds for countries like Austria and 
Belgium, where redistribution policies seem to have significantly lowered the 
degree of inequality compared to the euro area average.5 Putting all different 
pieces together, inequality developments are more complex than what a 
synthetic indicator can capture. Hence, a more granular analysis may add up 
to our understanding of such complexity. This is the purpose of our next 
sections. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In order to analyze the dynamics of the contribution of each income source to 
the overall inequality, we outline two different inequality indexes and their 
decompositions by income sources: the Gini and the Zenga index. We will 
show that, while the decomposition of both indexes provide insightful 
information on the inequality dynamics by income sources, the Zenga (2007)                                                         5 While changes in public policies may be relevant in changing economic inequality, to assess idiosyncratic tax reforms and their re-distributive effects is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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index presents the additional advantage of allowing to quantify the role of  
population sub-groups,   hence   ‘zooming-in’   on   the   distribution   of   income  
before and during the crisis. Importantly, since our analysis is concerned with 
distributional issues, and given the great importance proportional tax, inter-
households transfer and contribution to social security play for inequality, the 
remainder of the analysis focuses on disposable income only.6 
 
4.1 Measuring  inequality:  a  comparison 
 
The Gini index is, probably, the most used and well-known index in the 
literature on income inequality (see Gini, 1914), and its specifications are 
several (see Yitzhaki, 1997). As anticipated before, however, the Gini index 
often fails to take into account the effective impact of the right tail of the 
income distribution (i.e. the richest) with respect to the left part of the tail (i.e. 
the poorest). 
 
As we showed in the previous section, quantile ratios represent a way to 
capture  the fundamental idea that the concepts of poor and rich are relative 
to each other. In order to cope with this problem along all the possible 
fractions of lowest (highest) incomes in the distribution, Zenga (2007) more 
recently proposed an inequality index based on the ratio between lower and 
upper arithmetic means. While we are not necessarily interested in 
introducing the Zenga index in itself, we are interested in its empirical 
application, especially with a view to measure inequality in relative terms, 
compared to a standard index such as Gini. In this setting, the assessment of 
inequality in the population is determined by the comparison of population 
sub–groups. The Gini index compares the left tail of the income distribution                                                         6 The results for gross income are available upon request from the authors.   
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(the poorest) with the whole population by attributing a weight proportional 
to the population share. On the contrary, the Zenga (2007) index compares 
each disjoint sub-group using the same weight for each comparison; hence 
allowing for a better comparison for each sub-group (including a better 
assessment of the right part of the income distribution, i.e. the richest).  
 
More formally, let i = (1,… , N) be the households in the population and 
s = (1,… , S)  be the possible sources of income. It is then possibile to define an 
income matrix Y, such that the element y୧ୱ represents the income of household 
i given source s. The variable y୧ = ∑   ୗୱୀଵ y୧ୱ thus represents the total income for 
household i. Moving to the income source dimension, we will further assume 
each column vector to represent the sources, and that total income is a 
random variable in a simple linear relationship. Let us denote total income as 
Y and the single variables representing the income sources as yୱ, then:  
Y =෍  
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
yୱ 
 
Without loss of generality, we will assume for the remainder of this section 
that total incomes are ordered such that 0 ≤ yଵ ≤ yଶ ≤ ⋯ ≤ y୧ ≤ ⋯ ≤ y୒ (with 
at least one strictly positive observation). Let the mean (total) income be 
denoted by µμଢ଼ = 1/N∑   ୒୧ୀଵ Y୧ and the mean income for each income source 
denotes as µμ୷౩ = 1/N∑   
୒
୧ୀଵ Y୧ୱ. The decomposition by income sources proposed 
for both indexes is then derived by applying the linearity property of the 
covariance – for the Gini index – and the arithmetic mean – for the Zenga 
index. As discussed earlier, the Gini index presents some limitation when it 
comes to the relationship between the left tail (the poorest) and the right tail 
(the richest) of the income distribution. In fact, it is computed by averaging, 
for each quantile of the distribution (cumulated fraction of household), the 
sum of incomes along the left tail (cumulated income for that quantile), and 
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then comparing it to the mean income of the whole population. As such, the 
Gini index underestimates the effect of the very poor with respect to the 
whole population (and the very rich) and stresses comparison between sub–
groups that are more similar. 
 
We are interested instead in a measure that can capture the increasing 
distance between the richest and the poorest parts of the population. That is 
where the alternative Zenga index comes into play (see Zenga, 2007). The 
index works as follows: for each element (household income level) i, let 
M
ି
୧ =
ଵ
୧
∑   ୧୨ୀଵ Y୨ be the lower mean for the income level i (i.e. the mean of the 
sub–group poorer than i) and M
ା
୧ =
ଵ
୒ି୧
∑   ୒୨ୀ୧ାଵ Y୨ be the upper mean for the 
income level i (i.e. the mean of the sub–group richer than i). The point 
inequality for the income level i is then defined as:  
 
 I୧ =
୑
శ
౟ି୑
ష
౟
୑
శ
౟
= 1 −  ୑
ష
౟
୑
శ
౟
 (1) 
 
which captures the relative variation of the lower mean with respect to the 
upper mean. 
 
The overall inequality index I is then computed by averaging I୧ over all 
observations:  
 
 I = ଵ
୒
∑   ୒୧ୀଵ I୧ =
ଵ
୒
∑   ୒୧ୀଵ
୑
శ
౟ି୑
ష
౟
୑
శ
౟
 (2) 
 
The properties of the curve I୧ have been studied in Zenga (2007) and Greselin 
et al. (2009). As mentioned previously, due to its construction, the Zenga 
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index allows for a comparison between each possible disjoint subgroup in the 
distribution. The intuition is that an increase in income for the richest (1 − p) 
fraction of the population will have an effect on the value of the inequality 
curve for the fraction of the p poorest. In the next section, we will show how 
the Zenga decomposition follows and how changes in the distribution of 
inequality by population sub-groups work. 
 
4.2 Inequality  index  decomposition   
 
Among the many ways to compute the Gini index, we refer to the geometric 
approach, based on the Lorenz curve L(p), which computes the Gini 
coefficient Gଢ଼ as follows:  
  
Gଢ଼ = 1 − 2න   
ଵ
଴
L(p)dp =
୆.୔. 
= 2න   
ଵ
଴
pL′(p)dp − 1 
  
where the last integral has been computed integrating by parts. Given two 
random variables X and Z, let:  
 
 GCov(X, Z) = cov(X, F୞(z)) 
 
be the so-called Gini covariance between X and Z. The Gini covariance differs 
from the standard covariance in that it does not measure the degree of 
linearity between two variables, but the degree of monotonicity, making it 
suitable for capturing non-linear (yet monotonic) relationships. This 
formulation will allow to express the Gini coefficient in terms of covariance 
with its rankings.  
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After some algebra, it is possible to express the Gini index in terms of Gini 
covariance between the income variable Y and its fractional rankings, 
expressed in terms of its distribution function Fଢ଼(y) = P(Y ≤ y), as follows:  
 
 Gଢ଼ =
ଶ
ஜౕ
cov(Y, Fଢ଼(y)) 
 
by considering the uniform random variable Fଢ଼(y) = p. The simple linearity 
property for the covariance of two variables leads us to write:  
 
Gଢ଼ =
2
µμଢ଼
෍  
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
yୱGCov(yୱ, Y) 
=
2
µμଢ଼
෍   
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
cov(yୱ, Fଢ଼(y)) 
 
which represents the Gini coefficient in terms of the covariance of source s 
with the fractional rankings of the total income. Normalizing by Gଢ଼ gives the 
relative contribution of source s to the global income inequality.  
 
De Vergottini (1950) identified  a  relationship  between  Gini’s  mean  difference  
and the covariance. This concept is at the basis of the decomposition proposed 
by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984; 1985). The latter authors show how the Gini 
coefficient can be rewritten by multiplying and dividing each income 
component s by the covariance between the same income component yୱ and 
its cumulative distribution function, and by further multiplying and diving it 
by µμ୷౩, as follows:  
   
                            Gଢ଼ =
ଶ
ஜౕ
∑   ୗୱୀଵ
ୡ୭୴(୷౩,୊(ଢ଼))
ୡ୭୴(୷౩,୊౯౩)
    ଶୡ୭୴(୷౩,୊(୷౩))
ஜౕ౩
    
ஜ౯౩
ஜౕ
                               (3) 
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=
2
µμଢ଼
෍   
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
R୷౩G୷౩  W୷౩ 
Expression (3) is a useful way to present income inequality as the sum of the 
product of three quantities: R୷౩ being the Gini correlation between income 
source yୱ and the total income, G୷౩ being the Gini index for the income 
component yୱ, and W୷౩ being the share of total income due to income 
component yୱ. While this Gini representation is standard, it is nonetheless 
necessary to understand comparisons with the alternative indicator employed 
(the Zenga index; see Zenga, 2007) and how the latter adds up to a more-
comprehensive analysis of inequality.  
 
Zenga et al. (2012) proposed a point decomposition by sources which exploits 
the simple linearity property of the arithmetic mean of the distribution: the 
arithmetic mean of a linear combination of variables is the same linear 
combination of the arithmetic means of each variable. In other words, we can 
rewrite the lower and upper means of the distribution appearing in (1) and 
(2), as follows:  
 
                                            M
ି
୧ =
ଵ
୧
∑   ୧୨ୀଵ ∑   
ୱ
ୱୀଵ y୨ୱ = ∑   ୱୱୀଵ ∑   ୧୨ୀଵ
ଵ
୧
y୨ୱ = ∑   ୱୱୀଵ M
ି
୧ୱ                                                                                        (4) 
  
M
ା
୧ =
1
N − i
෍   
୒
୨ୀ୧ାଵ
෍   
ୱ
ୱୀଵ
y୨ୱ =෍   
ୱ
ୱୀଵ
෍   
୒
୨ୀ୧ାଵ
1
N − i
y୨ୱ = ෍  
ୱ
ୱୀଵ
M
ା
୧ୱ 
 
Where M
ା
୧ୱ and M
ା
୧ୱ are, respectively, the upper and lower means for income 
group i with respect to source s. In the light of the above, equation (2) is 
rewritten as:  
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I =
1
N
෍  
୒
୧ୀଵ
I୧ =
1
N
෍  
୒
୧ୀଵ
M
ା
୧ − M
ି
୧
M
ା
୧
= 
=
1
N
෍  
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
෍  
୒
୧ୀଵ
M
ା
୧ୱ − M
ି
୧ୱ
M
ା
୧
=
1
N
෍  
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
Iୱ 
 
where Iୱ = ∑   ୒୧ୀଵ
୑
శ
౟౩ି୑
ష
౟౩
୑
శ
౟
 is the contribution of income source s to global 
inequality. It is then possible to compute the relative contribution of each 
source to global inequality by writing: βୱ =
୍౩
୍
 (with ∑   ୱ Iୱ = 1). In the same 
vein, an inequality index can be computed for different segments of the 
population, by exploiting the linear representation of the Zenga index (see 
Radaelli, 2010). 
 
4.3 Sample  correction  weights   
 
When dealing with the estimation of inequality indexes from survey-based 
data, it is important to take into account sample weights. For the Gini index, 
the fundamental problem is to correctly compute weight-based fractional 
rankings (see Van Kerm, 2009). On the contrary, and less trivially so, for the 
Zenga index we will need to introduce its computation in a frequency 
distribution framework (see also Zenga, 2007).  
 
In particular, let (y୧, w୧)୧ୀଵ୒  be the representation of the N observations with 
the respective sampling weights and let 0 ≠ yଵ∗, … , y୏, … , y୏∗  (with K ≤ N) be 
the unique observations of (y୧)୧ୀଵ୒ . In order to compute the new fractional 
rankings, associated with the K unique values, tied values must be considered 
(see Van Kerm, 2009). Once fractional rankings are computed, they can be 
directly used in Equation (3).  
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Let n୦ be the frequencies associated to each unique observation y୦∗ , where 
∑   ୦ n୦ = n, with n being the total number of observation (e.g. the total number 
of inhabitants of a country) or, in other terms, n = ∑   ୧ w୧ = ∑   ୦ n୦. Let N୦ =
∑   ୦୲ୀଵ n୲ be the cumulative frequencies and p୦ =
୒౞
୬
 be the cumulative relative 
frequencies. We can now define the low and upper means with respect to the 
cumulative relative frequencies p୦: M
ି
୮౞ =
ଵ
୒౞
∑   ୦୲ୀଵ y୲∗n୲ and 
M
ା
୮౞ =
ଵ
୬ି୒౞
∑   ୏୲ୀ୦ାଵ y୲∗n୲. Analogously to Equation (1), the point inequality 
index for level p୦ is then given by:  
 
 I୮౞ =
୑
శ
౦౞ି୑
ష
౦౞
୑
శ
౦౞
 (5) 
 
whereas the synthetic index is: 
 
 I = ଵ
୬
∑   ୏୦ୀଵ I୮౞n୦ (6) 
 
Equation (6) is a weighted average of the point inequality indexes where 
weights are computed from the sampling weights. The latter computation is 
performed as follows: 
 
 n୦ = ∑   ୒୧ୀଵ w୧l{y୦∗ = y୧} ⇔ p୦ =
ଵ
∑   ౟୵౟
∑   ୒୧ୀଵ w୧1{y୦
∗ = y୧}, (7) 
 
where l{⋅} is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 whenever 
y୦
∗ = y୧. 
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5. Results  
 
In this section we look at the extent of inequality across countries and over 
time based on the two inequality measures set out above. Particularly, we try 
to understand how alternative inequality measures, capturing with different 
receptivity deviations from equality in different parts of the distribution, fare 
in practice. In Section 5.2 the analysis focuses instead on the inequality of 
different income sources, following the decomposition set out in the previous 
Section. 
 
5.1 A  quick  comparison  between  inequality  indexes   
 
Figures 3 plots the aggregate income inequality constructed from the standard 
Gini coefficient, as well as the Zenga coefficient, normalized on the pre-2008 
period, and based on our extended income definition. For sake of 
comparability, we leave in the same chart the Gini and Zenga indexes based 
on standard income definition, where pensions received from individual 
private plans and interest on mortgage do not appear (see Table 1). Having 
the pre-2008 period as a benchmark is the result of both judgment on the 
observed labor market slack in 2008 (i.e. labor markets reacted with some lag 
to the real economic downturn) and practical considerations (i.e. 2007 is the 
first available year for some countries). Moreover, we assume 2008 to be a 
sensible choice for survey data as it may take some time for individuals to 
gauge their reduced income availability at the household level – especially in 
the light of real public social spending effectively growing as of 2008-09 (as a 
percentage of GDP) in many euro area countries (see OECD, 2012).  
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The two indexes produce qualitatively a similar picture, albeit normalizing 
the two indexes on (own) pre-2008 averages show a substantial scale 
difference. As stressed earlier, the Gini index may however underestimate 
comparisons between the very poor (left-tailed) and the whole population, 
while emphasizing comparisons which involve almost identical population 
subgroups. Against the backdrop of a fall in real GDP in 2009 (see OECD, 
2012), inequality seemed to have increased in most countries, independently 
of which index is regarded. However, in some countries, such as Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal, the Zenga indicator has decreased less in pre-2008 
terms (=100) compared to Gini, suggesting that the rise of inequality since 
2008 has not been as modest as previous studies would suggest. On the 
contrary, the Zenga index, vis-à-vis Gini, tends to be generally lower for 
Germany and France, whereas a clear picture does not emerge for Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland and the Netherlands, as the two indexes cross each other at 
different points of the sample. 
 
Moreover, compared to the baseline income definitions, we show that 
considering extended income variables does not generally change the scale of 
the evolution of Zenga and Gini inequality in most countries (Figure 3). 
However, somewhat different patterns are observed in Belgium, Spain, 
Finland, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands.   By construction of the two 
indexes, this implies that some of the new variables considered may favour 
one tail of the distribution more than the other, having an (un)equalizing 
effect on total income inequality. At this stage the interpretation of the results 
is certainly challenging and can be better dealt with an analysis of different 
income categories.  However, it is intuitive to assert that such developments 
are likely to be observed when income components have important (un-
)equalizing effects, especially decreasing (increasing) inequality between the 
lower end and the middle of the distribution. 
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Figure 3 – Zenga and Gini coefficients - net income vs. net extended income 
 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Where data is available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100). 
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Figure 3 (continued) – Zenga and Gini coefficients - net income vs. net extended income  
 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Where data is available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100) 
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5.2 Decomposition  of  inequality  by  income  sources   
 
In order to get deeper into the drivers of the inequality developments 
discussed above, we quantify the extent to which total income inequality 
(measured by the Zenga index) is explained by single income sources (Table 
3); see Zenga et al. (2012).7 It emerges that, between 2008 and 2010, the 
(positive) contribution of income from employment to overall inequality 
declined in all countries except in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in Cyprus 
and Finland. Although less sizeable compared to dependent employment, the 
contribution from self-employment also declined in all countries (except 
Austria). At the same time, however, the share on total income of payment for 
direct taxes remained high while the share of interests on mortgage has been 
quantitatively smaller (i.e. again, taxes and interests on mortgages are treated 
as negative income sources). Further, the contributions of the latter two 
declined over time.  
 
Clearly, if an income source represents a large share on total income (and this 
varies over time), it may have – in principle – a strong effect on inequality. 
However, the extent to which this is likely to affect inequality as a whole 
depends on the equality of the individual source itself. We start by looking at 
the pre-crisis (2005-2007). Total inequality is explained in order of importance 
by labour income, income from self-employment, other income, cash transfer 
(with the exceptions of France, Greece, Italy and Portugal, where cash 
transfers rank as third income source and, compared to the other countries, 
explains a much higher share of total inequality). 
 
                                                         7 For a discussion see Annex 2. 
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Table 3 – Contribution of income sources – net extended income (Zenga index=100)      2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AT Labour income 98.8 110.4 106.4 112.7 105.4 
  Self-empl. lab. Income 21.2 17.4 22.9 21.0 19.2 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 21.2 16.9 15.5 12.7 17.0 
  Other income (ext) 6.3 9.5 7.2 8.8 10.1 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 
  Taxes -47.4 -53.6 -51.3 -54.7 -51.5 
BE Labour income 128.7 118.7 125.9 122.3 129.4 
  Self-empl. lab. Income 16.6 22.5 13.7 11.7 16.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 
  Cash transfers -4.4 -3.9 -1.2 0.7 -4.7 
  Other income (ext) 12.8 9.3 9.7 12.9 9.0 
  Interests on mortg. -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -2.0 -2.2 
  Taxes -52.9 -45.9 -47.5 -46.7 -49.5 
CY Labour income 89.7 88.5 88.5 92.7 91.6 
  Self-empl. lab. Income 12.6 15.3 13.0 12.4 11.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 4.8 5.4 9.2 8.4 8.5 
  Other income (ext) 9.1 7.6 7.2 5.9 7.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 
  Taxes -16.3 -16.2 -16.9 -18.4 -18.8 
DE Labour income 101.5 101.7 107.8 110.5 109.7 
  Self-empl. lab. Income 25.3 28.2 23.4 19.2 16.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 
  Cash transfers 5.3 4.9 4.2 6.5 8.5 
  Other income (ext) 8.2 8.2 7.3 11.0 9.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.8 
  Taxes -41.7 -45.0 -44.6 -47.7 -45.7 
ES Labour income 34.2 103.9 99.6 94.6 92.1 
  
Self-empl. lab. Income 2.5 7.4 7.6 10.8 11.7 
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Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.4 
  Cash transfers 2.7 7.9 9.6 10.8 11.4 
  Other income (ext) 2.0 5.2 5.9 5.5 4.5 
  Interests on mortg. -0.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.6 
  Taxes -8.1 -24.4 -22.7 -21.4 -20.6 
FI Labour income 125.8 121.2 125.1 123.5 115.5 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 13.3 16.1 14.2 11.5 10.7 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 
  Cash transfers -7.8 -6.3 -6.4 -4.5 -3.5 
  Other income (ext) 25.7 22.3 21.6 20.4 22.3 
  Interests on mortg. -1.8 -2.7 -2.7 -2.0 -1.3 
  Taxes -57.2 -52.5 -53.5 -50.9 -48.6 
FR Labour income 92.1 67.1 68.8 69.8 70.3 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 17.9 15.7 15.2 13.0 13.6 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 20.0 19.2 15.8 19.4 18.3 
  Other income (ext) 8.7 30.7 31.9 28.6 30.2 
  Interests on mortg. -1.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 
  Taxes -37.7 -29.0 -31.0 -30.0 -31.8 
GR Labour income 79.5 83.6 77.3 72.1 72.7 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 42.8 38.9 40.2 42.9 41.7 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 
  Cash transfers 16.0 16.1 17.3 19.0 17.7 
  Other income (ext) 9.5 8.5 8.2 9.1 8.4 
  Interests on mortg. -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
  Taxes -47.3 -46.7 -42.9 -42.9 -40.2 
IE Labour income 101.7 105.1 114.2 106.8 . 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 32.7 25.7 22.9 14.7 . 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 . 
  Cash transfers -4.2 -2.7 -0.5 8.6 . 
  Other income (ext) 6.3 9.2 5.3 4.3 . 
  Interests on mortg. -2.1 -2.6 -3.5 -2.2 . 
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  Taxes -35.1 -35.5 -38.9 -32.5 . 
IT Labour income 73.4 68.6 68.1 68.3 68.1 
  
Self-empl. lab. Income 41.6 47.8 43.4 45.4 41.5 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
  Cash transfers 23.1 25.7 27.8 27.5 28.9 
  Other income (ext) 6.4 7.4 7.5 6.5 8.0 
  Interests on mortg. -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
  Taxes -44.2 -49.3 -46.8 -47.6 -47.2 
NL Labour income 118.0 117.0 113.9 122.9 124.1 
  
Self-empl. lab. Income 19.4 27.4 30.0 28.0 28.5 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.1 
  Cash transfers 14.3 11.3 14.3 14.3 14.0 
  Other income (ext) 13.1 21.1 18.7 11.2 12.5 
  Interests on mortg. -3.0 -6.9 -5.6 -5.1 -5.0 
  Taxes -64.0 -72.4 -74.0 -73.7 -77.3 
PT Labour income 101.2 94.9 94.3 102.4 101.1 
  
Self-empl. lab. Income 15.9 20.5 19.9 11.9 11.5 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
  Cash transfers 21.4 20.5 19.4 19.2 21.9 
  Other income (ext) 3.2 3.6 4.1 5.3 4.4 
  Interests on mortg. -1.3 -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 
  Taxes -41.4 -38.2 -36.7 -37.9 -39.1 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Contribution of single income sources normalized onto overall inequality (Zenga index = 100).  
 
At the start of the crisis (2008, compared to pre-crisis) a strong increase of 
inequality explained by labour income in Spain and Austria is observed; 
together with strong reductions in the contribution of labour income in France 
and increases in the contribution of other income to overall inequality. After 
2008, the contribution of labour income decreased in Spain and Greece and it 
increased in Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time, the contribution 
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of self-employment labour income to overall inequality decreased in 
Germany. These results appear very much in line with the decomposition by 
sources of the Gini index (see Annex 1 – Table 2A).  
 
In the light of the considerations above, the effect of individual income 
sources on overall inequality will also depend on which point of the 
distribution this (extra) source is earned. In other words, it may be important 
to assess the marginal effect of both standard and extra income sources on 
overall inequality measures. In this respect, following our previous discussion 
in Section 4.2 (equation 3), the Gini decomposition allows to measure to what 
extent the observed contributions depend on: how (un)equal the distribution 
of each income source is (G୷ୱ); the relative importance of each individual 
component as a share of total income (W୷ୱ); the correlation between the 
distribution of aggregate income and that of the individual income 
component (R୷ୱ); allowing to calculate marginal effects. Marginal effects here 
account for the percentage change in inequality resulting from a small 
percentage change in income from a given source, all other things being 
equal. This corresponds to the original contribution of each source to income 
inequality  minus  each  source’s  share  on  total  income. 
 
The results in Figure 4 show, for instance, that in a country like Spain, a 1% 
increase in labour income contributed to an increase on the inequality 
computed on total income by about 0.24% in 2007. Labour income and – to a 
lesser extent – self-employment labour income and non-cash labour income 
have had a strong un-equalizing effect over time in most countries (except in 
France and Spain). An important un-equalising effect of income from self-
employment is observed instead in Italy. Cash transfers and taxes consistently 
acted by favouring people at the lower end of the income distribution. 
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Compared to the other income sources, results for the Netherlands show that 
interest on mortgages has had a relatively strong un-equalizing effect on total 
income. To a much lesser extent, a similar pattern is observed in France, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. In the case of Finland, France and the Netherlands, 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, 
Italy and Greece other income sources (including private pension plans) have 
had an un-equalizing effect.   
Figure 4 – Marginal effects  
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5.3 Zooming-in:  inequality  decomposition  by  income quantiles   
 
The contribution of each source to the global inequality is related to specific 
income levels. In what follows, we take a closer look at the decomposition of 
inequality by source, by considering the mean contribution for a specific pair 
quantile-source. In particular, we compare how the relative contribution of 
each income source is distributed across quantiles in 2007 (Fig. 5, left-panels) 
and 2011 (Fig. 5, right panels).  
 
Overall, in both 2007 and 2011, labour income seems to have played a 
relatively major role in the lowest percentiles (20, 40). This picture is different 
in Portugal (where labour income is high also in the top 80%), Greece and 
Spain (broadly flat). In 2011, relative to 2007, these figures are confirmed for 
most countries again with the exceptions of Spain and Greece, where labour 
income is more heterogeneous across quantiles, Ireland, where labour income 
became relatively more important in the middle of the distribution, and 
Portugal, where the weight of labour income decreases towards the right tail. 
As   far   as   “other   income”   is   concerned   important   increases   are   observed   in  
France in 2011, as also confirmed in the previous table with relative 
contributions. 
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Figure 5 – Index decomposition by quantiles (based on Zenga) 
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5.4 Zooming-in:  quantile  regressions 
 
With the aim of providing a richer characterization of the data, allowing to 
consider the impact of (some) covariates on the entire distribution of 
household income (by quantiles), quantile regressions are finally run for each 
country (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Chamberlain, 1994). The dependent 
variable is the (log) total household disposable income for the cross sections 
of 2007 and 2011. As income observations are available at the household level, 
the exercise is performed by looking at the characteristics of a representative 
individual in each household (head). Information about the other individuals 
in   the  households   is   considered  as  well   (number  of   children,  head’s  partner  
working status). Importantly these estimates show the relationship between 
covariates and log total disposable income and do not necessarily represent a 
causal relationship. The analysis presented here allows digging into the 
determinants of income inequality, providing a unique country-by-country 
assessment of the drivers of inequality   by   households’   head   characteristics.  
Such an analysis goes beyond an income decomposition by source of the 
previous   sections   and   rather   looks   at   the   significance   of   household   head’s  
characteristics in driving total (household) income (and, again, not its 
individual components) by quantiles.  
 
In particular, the proposed approach allows estimating the effect of potential 
determinants of inequality on all parts of the income distribution. An analysis 
of this type is better suited to answer the question about what are the drivers 
of income inequality. In this exercise, the explanatory variables for each 
country   include:   Partner   employed   (=1   if   the   head’s   partner   is   employed);  
Number of children (i.e. or the total number of people in the household minus 
the head and other adults); Part-time Job (=1 if the head has a part-time 
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job);Age groups (=1 if the head is less than 24 years old, =2 if the head is 
between 25 and 39 years old, =3 if the head is between 40 and 54 years old, =4 
if the head is between 55 and 75 years-olds); Housing tenure/tenure status (=1 
if the head is a tenant but he/she does not pay rent (beneficiary), =2 if the head 
is owner of the dwelling, =3 if the head is owner of the dwelling but with a 
mortgage, =4 if the head is a tenant); Educational attainment  (=1 if the head 
has low education, =2 if the head has medium education, =3 if the head has 
high education).8   
 
In the analysis, which we limit to a visual inspection, we also plot the 
conditional mean of household disposable income based on a standard OLS 
regression – using the same set of covariates – to show that a more complete 
picture of covariate effects is provided by estimating a family of conditional 
quantile functions. The interpretation of quantile regression results is similar 
to that of OLS estimates, with the important difference that standard ordinary 
least square estimates only look at the effect of mean income on the overall 
income distribution.  
 
In each quantile regression, the first category for each explanatory variable 
(e.g., low education in the case of educational attainment) is omitted, so that 
the coefficients may be interpreted relative to this omitted category. Again, 
the impact on income of the variables listed above is likely to differ across 
quantiles (e.g. higher education is arguably more valuable for high income 
households’  heads  than  for  low  income  ones).  OLS  ignore  such  heterogeneity  
as they only provide estimates of the mean effect of the covariates (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
 
                                                        8 Based on ISCED classifications. 
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The Figure below (Figure 6) presents a summary of quantile regression results 
for some selected country examples. The analysis considers 10 covariates, plus 
an intercept. Again, the quantile regression focuses on the quantile of 
household   income  conditional  on  each  household’s head characteristics. For 
each  of  the  10  coefﬁcients,  we  plot  the  19  distinct  quantile  regression  estimates  
with the quantile dimension ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 as the solid curve with 
ﬁlled  dots.  For  each  covariate,  these  point  estimates  are  understood  as a small 
change   in   household’s   head   characteristics   in   each   quantile   of   the   overall  
distribution. Each of the plots has a horizontal quantile scale, and the vertical 
scale indicates the covariate effect.  
 
The  dashed   line   in   each  ﬁgure   shows   the  ordinary least squares estimate of 
the conditional mean effect. The two dotted lines represent conventional 90 
percent   conﬁdence   intervals   for   the   least   squares   estimate.  The   shaded  grey  
area   depicts   a   90   percent   pointwise   conﬁdence   band   for   the   quantile  
regression  estimates.  In  the  ﬁrst  panel  of  the  ﬁgure,  the  intercept  of  the  model  
may be interpreted as the estimated conditional quantile function of the 
household disposable income distribution of a family head whose partner is 
unemployed, himself/herself with a full-time job, less than 24 years old, who 
is a tenant not paying his/her rent and with low education.  
We  will  conﬁne  our  discussion  to  only  a  few  of  the  covariates.  At  any  chosen  
quantile we can ask, for example, how different is the corresponding impact 
on household disposable income, given its head characteristics. We start by 
interpreting the results for 2007 for Germany (DE), Spain (ES) and Italy (IT) 
(Figure 7).  
 
Having a partner employed is relevant especially at the lower end of the 
distribution. In the picture, family heads to the left of the chart are those with 
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low income. As it can be gauged from the second right panel in each Figure, 
the effect of having a partner employed is always positive, with a marginal 
higher effect for the I quantile. In this case, a downward sloping curve means 
that a 1 p.p. increase in the likelihood of having a partner employed for a 
family head increases income more at the bottom than at the top of the 
distribution. This effect is monotonic in the case of Spain and Italy, but it is 
non-linear in the case of Germany. A high number of children has consistently 
a negative impact on household disposable income (controlling for other 
factors). In addition, having a head with a part-time job is always found to 
have a negative impact on household disposable income. However, the effect 
is particularly negative for smaller quantiles. Moreover, compared to a person 
less than 24 years old, being between the ages of 25-39, 40-54 or 55-75 does 
have an increasing positive impact of household disposable income, possibly 
because of the effect of tenure on wage. Within each age category, this effect is 
however downward sloping, with age being a more relevant factor at lower 
quantiles. Being the owner of the dwelling (tenure status = 2) is moreover 
found to have a positive impact on household disposable income and this 
effect is found to decrease by quantiles.  Finally, compared to a head with low 
education, having medium or high education is always found to have a 
positive effect on income, and this is found to increase every time by quantile 
groups (the richer the household the stronger the effect of education).  
 
All in all, the homogeneity hypothesis for the 2007 regression results (or the 
hypothesis that quantile regression results are not statistically different from 
OLS estimates) is rejected in most cases, as evidenced by the fact that quantile 
regression estimates do not stand within the OLS estimated confidence bands. 
This provides an indirect test that going beyond a mean-regression approach 
is useful, validating a quantile regression approach.  
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When moving to the results for the 2011 cross-section, the results change quite 
dramatically and, albeit some patterns, as described previously, are 
preserved, the picture becomes much less clear (Figure 7). In particular, while 
quantiles are still non–linear, the homogeneity hypothesis is not rejected in 
most cases. On the contrary, quantile regression results show a more stable 
pattern of return across quantiles for many of the dummy variables 
considered, consistent, in this case, with OLS estimates. For the three 
countries under scrutiny, sometimes a big blip for bottom/top-income 
households is found, which only in a few cases is statistically different from 
linear regression estimates. These results suggest that the impact of each 
covariate  on  different  parts  of  the  income  distribution  has  become  more  “flat”  
during the crisis. In other words, quantile dispersion, while significant in 
2007, decreased in 2011, with differences across covariates  (head’s  individual  
characteristics) becoming not significantly different across quantiles.  This 
seems   to   suggest   that   the   crisis   has   “smoothed”   the   effect   of   individual  
household  (head’s)  characteristics,  against  other  factors  (i.e.  possibly  varying 
income source share and contribution over time). 
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Figure 6 – Quantile regressions (2007) for selected EA countries   (i) Germany (DE) 
 (ii) Spain (ES)  
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 (iii) Italy (IT) 
  
Figure 7 – Quantile regressions (2011) for selected EA countries   (i) Germany (DE) 
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 (ii) Spain (ES) 
 (iii) Italy (IT) 
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6. Conclusion  
 
The aim of the paper was to look at how inequality has evolved in some 
selected euro area countries since the start of the crisis and – more 
importantly – to shed some light on which portions of the income distribution 
actually drove the observed dynamics in the aggregate, coupled with an 
analysis of the contribution of the individual income source. Based on 
household level data from the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC), for the cross-sections 2004 to 2011, in the paper we showed a 
broader set of income inequality indicators, where measures used spanned 
from the standard Gini index based on household disposable income – 
thereby allowing a comparison with the results available in the literature – to 
an alternative indicator, the Zenga index (2007), and an extended income 
definition. The computation of the Zenga (2007) inequality index, allowed us 
to detect deviations from equality in any parts of the distribution, including 
the left (poorest) and the right (richest) parts of the tail, differently from what 
the Gini index would do. In doing so, the Zenga index was first decomposed 
into the contribution to overall inequality coming from single income sources. 
The rationale behind this exercise was to have a quantitative assessment of 
inequality developments as a result of the economic crisis, especially in those 
economies which were more hardly hit. Secondly, inequality was further 
analysed with respect to the aforementioned extended income definition, 
including additional income components, some of which being particularly 
relevant in the current conjuncture, such as interest paid on mortgage or 
private pension plans. 
 
While broadly confirming the distributional effect of the crisis documented in 
previous studies, we found that, in specific countries, the level of inequality 
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appears higher when alternative measures are taken into account, and that the 
rise of inequality since 2008 has not been as modest as previous studies would 
suggest. Exploiting the aforementioned Zenga decomposition, the paper 
finally looked at how the distribution of income has evolved during the crisis 
by   income   quantile   groups   (i.e.   ‘zooming-in’).   An   analysis   of   income  
inequality at such a granular level was indeed made possible by the use of the 
Zenga index (2007) and its linearity property (see Section 4). The results 
pointed to varying contribution of labour income in 2011 compared to 2007. In 
addition, looking at the effect of household characteristics on the entire 
distribution of income, we found that while the impact of such characteristics 
showed a non-linear pattern across income quantile groups before the crisis; 
such dispersion has decreased in 2011. This reconciles with the idea that the 
crisis  has  possibly  “smoothed”  the  effect  of  individual  characteristics,  against  
other factors (e.g., varying income source share and contributions over time). 
We argue, on the basis of our analysis, that euro area countries are 
“differently   unequal”   in   their inequality pattern, particularly when single 
income sources/quantile groups are examined. Any sensible analysis of the 
distributional impact of policies adopted during the crisis – particularly in 
more vulnerable economies – would therefore need to be carried out at a finer 
level of analysis.                
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Annex 1 Additional Charts and Tables 
 
Figure 1A – Evolution of inequality over the period 2004-11  
 
  
Table 1A – Data coverage     Income (gross) Disposable income (net) 
2004                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 13630 29629.8 24038.3 125.0 917119.9 13630 21460.2 14269.3 100.0 515921.2 BE 15076 27206.1 21647.2 10.0 848099.3 15076 20332.2 16230.3 0.0 638000.0 CY 10022 20451.5 16838.1 925.1 717436.4 10022 18321.7 14017.5 95.0 547746.1 DE 28785 28667.8 22182.8 10.0 527861.1 28785 21325.7 15242.3 2.0 468704.7 ES 35665 16491.9 10773.3 3.8 132516.7 35665 14054.6 8378.2 3.3 113724.3 FI 26466 32048.3 23490.9 164.0 654971.3 26466 23552.5 15658.8 118.0 521733.3 FR 25501 28381.3 25850.2 123.2 1207745.0 25501 23000.9 18029.7 124.0 577813.3 GR                     IE 12543 31584.6 28571.9 150.0 501777.7 12543 26639.7 20981.5 120.0 476915.1 IT 52145 24137.7 19090.8 27.7 562091.3 52145 18150.6 12120.2 55.0 315193.3 NL 25381 36464.3 26579.9 759.0 1151297.0 25381 23997.5 15523.0 268.5 479948.1 PT 11786 12397.0 12237.0 333.3 228604.4 11786 9896.0 8458.8 286.7 137971.8 
2005                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 5710 29568.2 22762.8 125.0 917119.9 5710 21389.5 13795.9 100.0 515921.2 BE 6285 26245.4 22323.7 10.0 848099.3 6285 19823.4 16486.0 0.0 638000.0 CY 3353 19853.9 18708.8 925.1 717436.4 3353 17775.6 15353.4 95.0 547746.1 DE 13212 28395.4 23078.9 10.0 527861.1 13212 21161.6 15731.1 2.0 468704.7 ES 12886 16489.1 11176.2 3.8 132516.7 12886 14092.6 8638.4 3.3 113724.3 FI 10462 31536.3 25061.3 164.0 654971.3 10462 23202.2 16763.4 118.0 521733.3 FR 10412 28616.6 26698.7 123.2 1207745.0 10412 23278.8 18504.3 124.0 577813.3 GR                     IE 5239 29667.6 27834.1 150.0 501777.7 5239 25388.8 20416.9 120.0 476915.1 IT 20760 23977.7 19791.8 27.7 562091.3 20760 18091.0 12523.8 55.0 315193.3 NL 10304 36370.1 28033.4 759.0 1151297.0 10304 24070.6 15727.9 268.5 479948.1 
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PT 4439 12150.9 12397.0 333.3 228604.4 4439 9837.6 8661.9 286.7 137971.8 
2006                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 13606 30424.3 19588.3 20.0 337998.5 13606 22216.9 11880.1 16.0 204100.0 BE 14678 27981.4 19527.3 19.4 651843.5 14678 21214.9 13722.0 19.4 604689.5 CY 9281 21248.6 17441.5 1360.0 698266.7 9281 18950.1 14546.8 1040.0 537733.3 DE 28336 28476.8 20027.9 10.0 518000.0 28336 21355.7 13949.1 10.0 454760.0 ES 36158 16969.0 11087.7 2.6 183946.7 13524 6523.6 3736.5 2.0 40388.8 FI 25141 33359.9 23973.7 200.0 688763.0 36158 14592.3 8750.6 2.0 177166.0 FR 25595 29053.5 26693.5 11.0 1152651.0 25595 23655.5 19740.1 10.0 661973.3 GR 17855 17303.4 15519.1 30.9 299704.8 17855 13049.2 9922.4 27.8 173684.8 IE 12631 30941.5 25187.0 4.4 351066.9 12631 25854.8 16546.9 3.3 250374.4 IT 50962 24881.7 20801.1 2.5 579040.0 50962 18673.0 13221.8 2.5 333388.0 NL 23640 37882.3 26581.4 1020.0 1412640.0 23640 24539.2 14771.8 263.8 631358.0 PT 13013 12359.5 12374.0 168.0 247578.7 13013 9969.9 8641.9 168.0 197171.3 
2007                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 5874 30503.0 20565.1 20.0 337998.5 5874 22202.2 12606.1 16.0 204100.0 BE 6105 27414.9 21707.7 19.4 651843.5 6105 20987.3 15070.3 19.4 604689.5 CY 3142 20591.2 19657.5 1360.0 698266.7 3142 18402.8 16360.5 1040.0 537733.3 DE 13024 28124.4 20731.5 10.0 518000.0 13024 21132.2 14273.6 10.0 454760.0 ES 13087 17064.5 11511.2 2.6 183946.7 13087 14725.5 9059.3 2.0 177166.0 FI 10123 32699.6 25636.5 200.0 688763.0 10123 24189.7 17109.1 0.0 563315.0 FR 10595 29545.4 28240.5 11.0 1152651.0 10595 24139.4 20913.3 10.0 661973.3 GR 6934 16784.1 15568.8 197.0 299704.8 6934 12921.3 9933.2 30.0 173684.8 IE 5169 29437.0 25270.9 4.4 351066.9 5169 24977.9 17117.2 3.3 250374.4 IT 20355 24852.6 21745.5 2.5 579040.0 20355 18727.8 13793.2 2.5 333388.0 NL 9706 37806.0 29369.7 1020.0 1412640.0 9706 24657.0 16043.4 263.8 631358.0 PT 4949 12223.3 12463.9 168.0 247578.7 4949 9987.1 8762.0 168.0 197171.3 
2008                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 14085 32084.2 21850.2 83.8 325500.0 14085 23342.4 12967.4 67.0 204627.4 BE 14734 28458.6 18074.8 125.0 442721.6 14734 21339.0 12799.0 125.0 424382.7 CY 11081 21583.9 18325.9 793.3 748666.7 11081 19064.2 15899.5 480.0 709977.3 DE 27935 28961.2 25262.8 0.7 1644722.0 27935 21567.1 15962.3 68.0 838842.0 ES 36306 16976.0 11528.5 1.2 152728.3 36306 14629.7 9182.9 0.6 149385.0 FI 26994 33792.7 25011.0 38.0 686814.0 26994 25252.1 16637.1 0.0 544886.0 FR 26504 29258.7 23806.7 666.7 883162.0 26504 23938.3 17592.4 180.0 421666.7 GR 17496 17209.8 15220.5 80.0 244896.1 17496 13118.6 9663.6 0.0 152836.0 IE 11550 28846.1 29979.5 25.0 850267.0 11550 23515.5 17993.4 0.0 475721.8 IT 47296 24997.5 21476.9 4.3 994962.9 47296 18811.2 13468.3 4.3 571587.2 NL 24564 38132.8 24034.2 936.0 1025993.0 24564 24638.7 13140.9 146.0 549589.3 PT 13368 12375.4 10731.9 207.0 141185.4 13368 10045.1 7407.9 207.0 88236.5 
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2009   Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 6186 32027.6 22372.9 83.8 325500.0 6186 23281.8 13364.9 67.0 204627.4 BE 6121 27667.5 18876.0 125.0 442721.6 6121 20959.2 13534.0 125.0 424382.7 CY 3776 20952.3 20043.6 793.3 748666.7 3776 18510.0 17501.2 480.0 709977.3 DE 13005 28817.3 28235.7 0.7 1644722.0 13005 21516.4 17528.8 68.0 838842.0 ES 13307 17044.7 11750.7 1.2 152728.3 13307 14744.9 9330.0 0.6 149385.0 FI 10977 33128.0 26353.5 38.0 686814.0 10977 24824.1 17628.5 0.0 544886.0 FR 11031 29590.9 24408.8 666.7 883162.0 11031 24272.6 17811.5 180.0 421666.7 GR 6937 16695.6 15091.1 80.0 244896.1 6937 12980.8 9560.2 80.0 152836.0 IE 4613 27646.7 26091.4 25.0 850267.0 4613 23040.2 16314.7 0.0 475721.8 IT 18998 25074.7 21700.8 4.3 994962.9 18998 18930.5 13594.2 4.3 571587.2 NL 10103 38165.2 25217.5 936.0 1025993.0 10103 24813.5 13742.6 146.0 549589.3 PT 5166 12175.4 11099.5 207.0 141185.4 5166 10021.8 7707.8 207.0 88236.5 
2010                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 13927 32863.6 22361.2 12.5 491750.3 13927 24172.5 13895.8 10.0 292774.2 BE 14276 28777.8 27172.7 47.6 2529400.0 14276 21861.8 17938.6 47.6 1684067.0 CY 11438 22603.6 18539.6 645.0 802944.7 11438 19847.3 16294.6 520.0 766834.7 DE 28580 29618.3 22879.1 31.0 1050177.0 28580 22087.6 15490.7 31.0 587974.0 ES 34146 16430.8 11121.3 3.1 117600.0 34146 14225.5 8976.1 2.5 117600.0 FI 23008 34927.0 33472.5 12.0 2401212.0 23008 26191.6 24463.0 0.0 1888896.0 FR 27050 30014.7 31820.5 65.0 1311026.0 27050 24342.1 23668.3 60.0 922660.0 GR 14932 15046.7 12816.8 120.0 263483.2 14932 11591.3 8441.2 0.0 181666.7 IE 10979 28107.9 22805.9 19.1 361525.1 10979 22776.6 14308.3 15.0 218626.3 IT 47548 25973.7 29325.6 4.0 1964900.0 47548 19311.2 17528.2 0.0 1091677.0 NL 25408 38701.0 25936.1 40.0 1323389.0 25408 24628.1 13303.7 40.0 539086.0 PT 14660 12486.1 11140.1 254.5 154309.6 14660 9985.8 7576.4 254.5 127968.1 
2011                       Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max AT 6183 32729.7 23244.3 12.5 491750.3 6183 24088.1 14438.8 10.0 292774.2 BE 5895 28338.5 37259.9 47.6 2529400.0 5895 21729.6 24756.3 47.6 1684067.0 CY 3914 22220.5 20776.7 645.0 802944.7 3914 19522.8 18415.8 520.0 766834.7 DE 13418 29254.2 23456.8 31.0 1050177.0 13418 21885.9 15848.3 31.0 587974.0 ES 12841 16556.2 11462.1 3.1 117600.0 12841 14401.4 9217.9 2.5 117600.0 FI 9343 34319.1 37349.4 12.0 2401212.0 9343 25858.4 27602.8 0.0 1888896.0 FR 11345 30302.4 30398.2 65.0 1311026.0 11345 24694.3 22446.3 60.0 922660.0 GR 5942 14644.5 12788.1 120.0 263483.2 5942 11403.5 8422.1 0.0 181666.7 IE           IT 19227 26093.7 28698.4 4.0 1964900.0 19227 19495.1 17293.8 0.0 1091677.0 NL 10469 38735.2 27112.2 40.0 1323389.0 10469 24793.1 13936.7 40.0 539086.0 PT 5725 12383.8 11554.0 254.5 154309.6 5725 10033.8 7900.0 254.5 127968.1 
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Table 2A – Contribution of income sources – net extended income (Gini index=100)      2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AT Labour income 101.1 112.7 110.2 115.1 108.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 21.2 17.8 22.2 21.1 19.3 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 20.3 15.9 13.7 11.7 15.9 
  Other income (ext) 6.2 9.4 7.3 8.7 10.1 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 
  Taxes -48.7 -55.2 -52.9 -56.0 -53.7 
BE Labour income 134.7 125.2 131.9 129.9 136.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 16.9 22.1 13.3 12.0 14.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 
  Cash transfers -7.6 -6.6 -4.2 -3.3 -7.9 
  Other income (ext) 12.4 9.5 9.5 12.4 8.9 
  Interests on mortg. -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1 -2.3 
  Taxes -55.6 -49.4 -49.9 -50.0 -52.1 
CY Labour income 90.8 91.0 90.3 95.0 95.0 
  Self-empl. lab. income 12.0 13.9 12.2 11.3 10.1 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
  Cash transfers 5.1 5.3 8.9 8.1 7.6 
  Other income (ext) 8.9 7.4 7.2 6.0 7.5 
  Interests on mortg. . -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
  Taxes -16.8 -16.8 -17.7 -19.5 -20.3 
DE Labour income 106.6 106.6 112.7 115.3 114.0 
  Self-empl. lab. income 25.2 27.9 22.8 18.8 16.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 
  Cash transfers 2.9 2.6 1.7 4.6 6.5 
  Other income (ext) 8.4 8.4 7.5 10.9 9.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.7 
  Taxes -44.4 -47.7 -46.9 -50.0 -48.1 
ES Labour income 70.0 107.6 103.7 99.5 95.5 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 5.8 6.7 7.0 10.1 11.3 
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Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 
  Cash transfers 3.8 6.2 7.5 8.0 9.8 
  Other income (ext) 3.3 5.4 5.8 5.5 4.5 
  Interests on mortg. . -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.8 
  Taxes -16.3 -25.6 -23.6 -22.8 -21.7 
FI Labour income 132.3 126.7 130.4 129.6 121.6 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 13.5 16.3 14.5 11.4 11.2 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.7 
  Cash transfers -11.4 -9.1 -9.4 -7.5 -7.0 
  Other income (ext) 24.5 21.1 20.6 19.3 21.1 
  Interests on mortg. -1.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.1 -1.4 
  Taxes -59.1 -54.4 -55.3 -52.8 -50.4 
FR Labour income 93.3 66.7 68.0 70.1 70.2 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 17.5 16.0 15.9 13.1 13.9 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 19.9 18.8 15.7 18.6 18.1 
  Other income (ext) 9.0 31.4 32.7 29.4 30.8 
  Interests on mortg. -1.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 
  Taxes -38.5 -29.4 -31.5 -30.5 -32.4 
GR Labour income 82.9 85.2 81.6 76.4 76.5 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 42.2 39.4 39.3 42.2 39.2 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 15.4 16.1 16.3 16.2 16.7 
  Other income (ext) 10.1 8.8 8.6 9.7 9.3 
  Interests on mortg. -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 
  Taxes -50.1 -49.0 -45.5 -44.3 -41.4 
IE Labour income 106.4 110.4 120.0 112.5 . 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 32.0 25.2 23.2 15.5 . 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 . 
  Cash transfers -6.1 -5.6 -4.8 4.6 . 
  Other income (ext) 6.4 9.3 5.6 4.4 . 
  Interests on mortg. -2.2 -2.6 -3.6 -2.5 . 
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  Taxes -37.1 -37.5 -40.8 -34.9 . 
IT Labour income 75.4 70.9 70.6 70.1 70.6 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 41.7 47.5 43.4 44.8 42.0 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 22.2 24.7 26.5 26.9 27.5 
  Other income (ext) 6.6 7.6 7.8 6.9 8.2 
  Interests on mortg. -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
  Taxes -45.5 -50.6 -48.2 -48.6 -48.8 
NL Labour income 121.7 119.7 118.6 126.8 127.3 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 20.8 28.5 30.2 27.9 29.0 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.2 
  Cash transfers 12.4 10.7 12.5 13.4 13.5 
  Other income (ext) 12.6 20.5 18.4 11.1 12.1 
  Interests on mortg. -3.4 -7.0 -6.0 -5.5 -5.7 
  Taxes -66.5 -75.1 -76.6 -76.2 -79.4 
PT Labour income 102.5 96.7 96.3 104.7 103.9 
  
Self-empl. lab. income 16.0 20.9 20.1 12.3 12.1 
  
Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
  Cash transfers 21.3 20.6 18.7 18.1 21.2 
  Other income (ext) 3.2 3.7 4.4 5.5 4.4 
  Interests on mortg. -1.3 -1.6 -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 
  Taxes -42.7 -40.3 -38.5 -39.6 -41.4 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Contribution of single income sources normalized onto overall inequality (Gini index = 100). 
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Annex  2  Treatment  of  ‘residuals’ 
 
As discussed in our data Section, consistent with the assumption of income 
(whether gross or net) adding up to the sum of the individual income sources, 
a residual component is included in the contribution of income components to 
aggregate income. Here, the residual component represents the part of 
income which is not accounted for by the available income decomposition 
sources in the EU-SILC (i.e. the sum of individual income sources does not 
always add up to total household income, as in Table 1).  
 
There might be a number of reasons why one should expect such a 
discrepancy measure to appear in the data. First, survey answers may go 
wrong as people can forget, make mistakes or simply do not respond. 
Secondly, people may be reluctant to disclose the full extent of their income 
(e.g., coming from illegal activities, tax evasion, etc.). Finally, some parts of 
income, retained profits and/or related costs may be difficult to quantify (see 
also World Bank, 2001). In our analysis, such a discrepancy results in an 
observed income indicator which contains an additive error term. This may 
cast some doubts on the interpretation of the income sources and the 
decomposition exercise outlined previously.  
 
In order to test for the statistical significance of the residual and investigate 
the   robustness   of   our   results   to   such   a   ‘residual’   component,   we   estimate  
bootstrapped confidence bands for the Gini coefficient in each country. The 
bootstrapped standard errors and estimates for Gini inequality index are 
calculated on total income. The Gini coefficient so obtained, together with 
bootstrapped two-standard errors confidence bands, is plotted against the 
Gini coefficient calculated as the sum of the individual income components. 
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The divergence between the two is simply explained by the existence of a 
‘residual’.  Hence,  the  possibility  that  the  Gini  index  calculated  on  the  sum  of  
the income sources falls in between the bootstrapped confidence bands for the 
Gini calculated on total income provides an indirect test for the statistical 
significance of the residual in our series. The Gini coefficient calculated on the 
sum of the income components gets, in all cases, close to the index calculated 
on total income series, soundly rejecting the hypothesis that the residual is 
statistically significant. Nonetheless, it is less so for Spain for the years 2004 
and 2005, where the Gini coefficient calculated on the sum of the individual 
income sources moves away from the one calculated on total income and 
outside the estimated confidence bands.  
 
Overall, however, also in the case of Spain the pattern that emerges from 
leaving the residual in the income decomposition exercise differs negligibly 
from an analysis where the residual is spread onto the other income 
components, in proportion to each component contribution to the overall 
income. Hence, the analysis is performed without considering an explicit 
‘residual’  component  in  the  decomposition  exercise  by  income  sources. 
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